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"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people pea-
cably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
First Amendment to the United States Constitution
"For almost two centuries, our country has taken singular pride in
the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitution, and the most
cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First
Amendment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liber-
ties-the freedom of association-which makes the defense of the
Nation worthwhile."
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)
INTRODUCTION
Americans have brought numerous legal challenges to mass elec-
tronic surveillance programs conducted by the National Security
Agency ("NSA"). These challenges have largely focused on the statu-
tory basis for the programs and their legality under the Fourth
Amendment.' In addition, however, some plaintiffs have alleged that
* J.D., Harvard Law School, Class of 2016. Many thanks to Susan Crawford, Andy Sellars,
Patrick Toomey, and Brian Sparks.
Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association's Specificity
Requirement, 10 I/S:J. L. & POLY FOR INFO. SOC'Y 327 (2014).
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the programs infringe on their First Amendment rights.! The gov-
ernment, in defending one NSA program, argued that a program
that is consistent with the Fourth Amendment necessarily satisfies the
First Amendment.3 This Article seeks to demonstrate that this inter-
pretation does not adequately protect Americans' constitutional
rights to the freedom of speech and association. Therefore, the Arti-
cle argues, a court evaluating the legality of the NSA's mass surveil-
lance programs must conduct an independent First Amendment
analysis.
In analyzing government acts that implicate First Amendment
rights, courts use "exacting" or "strict" scrutiny, the highest standard
of judicial review, which requires that the government action be
"adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the sup-
pression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significant-
ly less restrictive of associational freedoms.",5 Thus, the government
may not restrict First Amendment rights except by a program or ac-
tion that is a) based upon a compelling government need, b) effec-
tive in fulfilling that need, and c) not overbroad.
Existing First Amendment law is driven by three principles that
both support this conclusion and provide a framework for analyzing
mass surveillance programs. First, the government cannot seek to
know with whom Americans associate, absent a compelling need. Se-
cond, the First Amendment prevents the government from acting in
a way that deters political and associational activity. Third, the First
Amendment requires that government programs be narrow in scope,
such that the government must tailor its programs to meet specific
objectives. Current surveillance programs violate all three principles.
Mass electronic surveillance gathers associational information, in
most cases absent a compelling need. The surveillance programs in
question demonstrably have a chilling effect on First Amendment ac-
tivity. Finally, bulk, indiscriminate collection does not pass the test of
being narrow in scope and tailored to specific objectives. For these
reasons, at least some of the NSA surveillance programs likely violate
the First Amendment.
2 ACLU v. Clapper--Challenge to NSA Mass Call-tracking Program, ACLU (Oct. 29, 2015),
https://www.aclu.org/cases/aclu-v-clapper-challenge-nsa-mass-call-tracking-program.
3 ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), vacated in part, 785 F.3d 787
(2015).
4 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2548 (2012).
5 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
6 For an argument that mass surveillance violates specificity requirements implied by the
First Amendment, see Strandburg, supra note 1.
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Following discussion of the above, this Article focuses on one spe-
cific program, allegedly authorized under Section 215 of the Patriot
Act, by which the NSA engaged in the bulk collection of telephony
metadata. Though the Section 215 program expired June 1, 2015'
(and the USA FREEDOM Act limits any attempt to reinstate the pro-
gram"), its operation raised important First Amendment issues that
have not been adequately addressed and that are implicated by other
mass surveillance programs. The Article argues that the Section 215
program fails to satisfy the First Amendment because it is neither ap-
propriately tailored nor effective at achieving a compelling govern-
ment interest. Though this Article focuses on Section 215, this analy-
sis should be applied to other mass surveillance programs.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Because the First Amend-
ment analysis requires an understanding of the government activity
in question, Part I provides factual information about the NSA pro-
grams. Part II argues that when considering the legality of the pro-
grams, courts must conduct an independent First Amendment analy-
sis. Part III discusses the test for legality under the First Amendment,
explores three driving principles of First Amendment jurisprudence,
and applies these principles to the Section 215 program.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: MASS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS
CONDUCTED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Beginning in 2001, the NSA developed and implemented a large-
scale program to collect digital information concerning Americans'
telephone communications. The program was kept secret from the
public until former NSA contractor and whistleblower Edward Snow-
den revealed its existence in 2013. Known as the Section 215 pro-
gram, it was based on a provision in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act that allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation to obtain
companies' "business records."9 The Patriot Act of 2001 expanded
this authority, and the NSA used it to obtain massive quantities of in-
7 Mark Jaycox & Dia Kayyali, Section 215 Expirev-For Now, ELECTRONIc FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (May 31, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/section-215-
expires-now
8 Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindication for Snowden, THE
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/
congress-surveillance-reform-edward-snowden.
9 PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE
OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 21-22 (2014), available
at http://www.pclob.gov/Library/215Report-on-the _TelephoneRecords_Program-
2.pdf (hereinafter "PCLOB Section 215 Report").
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formation about Americans' communications from telephone com-
panies."o The Section 215 program was initially intended to be a
short-term response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, but even-
tually became a "'permanent surveillance tool.'"" In 2006, the secret
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC") ruled that Section
215 of the Patriot Act (as amended in 2005) authorized the govern-
ment collection of all "call detail records."1 2 These records consist of
"metadata," which includes the phone number of each caller, the
date and time of each call, the length of each call, whether or not the
call was connected, calling card numbers, and the trunk identifier
and routing information (which can include location)."' This infor-
mation was collected in bulk and stored in a database. Under con-
tinuously renewed orders from the FISC, telephone companies were
required to provide call records to the NSA on an ongoing basis."
Once this collection occurred, NSA staff analyzed the data in ac-
cordance with certain procedures. An analyst (or an automated pro-
gram)6 conducted a "query" of the database, which means a search
for a specific identifier, such as a phone number or other selection
term." This allowed the NSA to link a suspect's phone number to
other numbers, and to develop "chains" of contacts." This process
could reveal links between individuals, bring new individuals under
suspicion, and allow for the monitoring of communications between
individuals.'9 Initially, the program's "three hop" policy allowed ana-
lysts to query any phone number that was connected to a suspect's
number by up to three degrees of separation. That is, given a sus-
pect's number, the NSA could search for the records of any phone
number connected to the first number, any number connected to the
second number, and any number connected to the third number.20
10 Id.
11 Id. at 37.
12 Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 732.
13 Doug Aamoth, Verizon, Telephony Metadata, the National Security Agency, and You, TIME (June
6, 2013), http://techland.time.com/2013/06/06/verizon-telephony-metadata-the-
national-security-agency-and-you/.
14 PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 9, at 25.
15 Id. at 46.
16 Id. at 30.
17 Id. at 26.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 27.
20 Fred Kaplan, Pretty Good Privacy: The Three Ambitious NSA Reforms Endorsed by Obama, and
the One He Rejected, S[ATE.COM (Jan. 17, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/
news-and-politics/war..stories/2014/01/obama s nsa reforms-thepresident s
proposalsformetadataand thefisa.html.
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President Obama modified this to two "hops" after the program's ex-
istence was made public." Records that were flagged as the result of a
query are stored in a separate database. These records could be ana-
lyzed and used for a broad range of intelligence purposes, including
sharing and cooperation with other agencies.2 The NSA's use of this
data may have included social network mapping2 3 and sharing with
24other governments.
There were two primary limitations on the querying of data. First,
analysts needed a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" that the selector
term was associated with a terrorist organization. This could be
based on information provided by another government agency, mak-
ing it easier for the analyst to develop a reasonable, articulable suspi-
cion. Second, with respect to selection terms that an analyst reason-
ably believed were used by a U.S. person,27 the reasonable articulable
suspicion could not be based solely on activities protected by the First
Amendment.28 Once information was in the separate database of ma-
terial that was flagged as the result of a query, no reasonable articula-
ble suspicion was required to conduct further analysis.
The NSA was previously required to destroy telephony metadata
after five years." However, if a record was flagged as the result of a
query, it could be stored for a longer period of time. It is unclear
how much data was retained through this procedure. In November
2015, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated that
21 Id.
22 PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 9, at 29.
23 James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. Citizens, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-
networks-of-us-citizens.html .
24 Andrea Germanos, British Spy Agency: We Don't Need a Warrant for Americans'Data. We Have
"Arrangements," COMMONDREAMS.ORG (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.commondreams.org/
news/2014/10/29/british-spy-age ncy-we-dont-need-warran t-americans-data-we-have-
arrangements.
25 PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 9, at 27.
26 Id. at 28.
27 According to the NSA, a U.S. person is a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, an unincorporated association with a substantial
number of members who are citizens of the U.S. or aliens lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence, or a corporation that is incorporated in the U.S. SIGINT Frequently Asked
Questions, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY & CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE,
https://www.nsa.gov/sig int/faqs.shtml#sigint4 (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
28 PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 9, at 28.
29 Id. at 30.
30 Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, US Intelligence Outlines Checks It Says Validate Surveil-
lance, THE GUARDIAN (June 15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/
16/nsa-the-nsa-files.
31 PCLOB SECTION 215 REPORT, supra note 9, at 25.
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the NSA would maintain the database until civil litigation regarding
the program is resolved, though it will not use or access the infor-
mation for any purpose unrelated to the litigation."
This Article focuses on Section 215 because relatively more infor-
mation is available about this program than about other programs.
However, the Section 215 program is only part of the vast surveillance
apparatus built by the NSA. Another program collects the content of
some communications. Other programs may collect location data
or Internet metadata." Many aspects of government surveillance
programs remain secret. Even given the limited information availa-
ble, however, it is possible to analyze First Amendment problems
raised by NSA mass surveillance. This Article will not address the
possible collection of content, location data, or Internet metadata,
other than to argue that any such collection likely raises concerns suf-
ficient to warrant an independent First Amendment analysis.
II. COURTS MUST CONDUCT AN INDEPENDENT FIRST AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS OF THE NSA PROGRAMS
The purpose of the First Amendment is substantively different
from that of the Fourth Amendment. As a result, the amendments
provide zones of protection that are not coextensive. Litigation chal-
lenging NSA surveillance to date has primarily focused on the Fourth
Amendment, which protects the privacy rights of American citizens
by requiring that the government obtain a valid warrant before con-
32 Press Release, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI Announces Transi-
tion to New Telephone Metadata Program (Nov. 27, 2015), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/210-press-releases-2015/1292-
odni-announces-transition-to-new-telephone-metadata-program; see also In re Application
of F.B.I., No. BR 14-96, 2014 WL 5463290 at *3 (FISA Ct. June 19, 2014) (allowing the
government to retain bulk telephony metadata "for the sole purpose of meeting preserva-
tion obligations in civil litigation pending against it").
33 See, e.g., PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT 19-20 (2014), available at http://www.pclob.gov/Libary/702-Report-
2.pdf (discussing the surveillance program that collects intelligence on the the communi-
cation between U.S. persons and "foreign targets" abroad).
34 Ellen Nakashima, NSA Had Test Project to Collect Data on Americans' Cellphone Locations, Direc-
tor Says, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-had-test-project-to-collect-data-on-americans-cellphone-locations-director-
says/2013/10/02/65076278-2b71-11e3-8ade-alf23cdal35e- story.html..
35 Charlie Savage, Reagan-Era Order on Sureillance Violates Rights, Says Departing Aide, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/us/politics/reagan-era-
order-on-surveillance-violates-rights-says-departing-aide.html?_r-0..
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ducting a search or seizure of property. The warrant requirement
applies anywhere that citizens have a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy." An electronic intrusion can qualify as a violation, as long as the
expectation of privacy is reasonable." Much of the media attention
and public discussion regarding the constitutionality of NSA pro-
grams has centered on this question of privacy," and it is likely that at
least some of the NSA programs violate the Fourth Amendment.
Notwithstanding the result of the Fourth Amendment analysis, how-
ever, courts confronting modern mass surveillance programs should
complete a separate First Amendment analysis as well.
As the Supreme Court noted in 1972, cases concerning national
security and government surveillance "often reflect a convergence of
First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary'
crime."o In some situations, the First Amendment may be more pro-
tective than the Fourth Amendment. For example, much of the NSA
litigation has centered on the extent to which the Fourth Amend-
ment protection is weakened when customers disclose their infor-
mation to cell phone service providers. This principle, known as the
third party doctrine, was established in Smith v. Maryland.1  In this
1979 case, the Court declared that the government's monitoring of
phone calls made by a single robbery suspect for a period of three
days, through a device installed by the telephone company, was not a
42
search. Smith's application to the NSA mass surveillance programs
has been criticized, 4 and courts have begun to push back against the
36 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) ("[S]earches conducted outside of the
judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment... .").
37 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding
that the Fourth Amendment affords protection to individuals when they have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation to privacy and when society recognizes that expectation
as reasonable).
38 Id. at 362 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[R]easonable expectations of privacy may be defeat-
ed by electronic as well as physical invasion.").
39 See, e.g., John Villasenor, What You Need to Know about the Third-Party Doctrine, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/
12/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-third-party-doctrine/28 2721/.
40 United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972).
41 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (finding that a person has no legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in the information she voluntarily turns over to third parties),
42 See id. at 745-46 (holding that the petitioner did not have a reasonable expectation to
privacy in the phone numbers he dialed, and thus, the use of a pen register was not a
search).
43 Jim Harper, If You Think Smith v. Maryland Permits Mass Surveillance, You Haven't Read
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third party doctrine to find expectations of privacy even in infor-
mation exposed to others." Regardless of the outcome of the Fourth
Amendment analysis, however, mass surveillance programs separately
implicate the First Amendment.
The First Amendment and Fourth Amendment protect different
rights and serve different purposes. The Fourth Amendment pro-
tects privacy, primarily benefitting the individual whose privacy is at
45issue. By contrast, the First Amendment protects the rights to asso-
ciation and expression. Though the First Amendment benefits indi-
viduals," it also benefits society as a whole by ensuring the freedom of
political activity that is necessary for a functioning democracy.47 The
First Amendment protects ideas and dissent in a way that the Fourth
Amendment does not, and this protection is of fundamental im-
portance for a free and democratic society.4 8
The Fourth Amendment is based on the idea that there is a zone
in which citizens' privacy is protected. The text of the Amendment
identifies this zone as citizen's "persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects."49 It has been interpreted to include public places where there
is a reasonable expectation of privacy, such as phone booths.o The
Fourth Amendment guarantee of privacy is critical, but political and
social engagement also depend upon citizens' willingness to associate
with others. Even if the privacy of every American were protected
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, this would not be enough to
ensure political and associational freedom. Protected speech and as-
44 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(declaring that "it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties," as
such an approach is ill-suited to the digital age); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
274 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in emails that were dis-
closed to an Internet Service Provider); United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th
Cir. 2014) (holding that "cell site location information is within a subscriber's reasonable
expectation of privacy" even though the information is available to the cell service pro-
vider).
45 Eric Lardiere, The jwsticiability and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence Gathering, 30
UCIA L. REv. 976, 1029-30 (1983).
46 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) ("[T]he First Amendment has a
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.").
47 Lardiere, supra note 45, at 1030-31.
48 See Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)
(citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957)) (discussing how the free-
dom of speech is necessary to promote political ideas, especially those supported by "mi-
nority, dissident groups").
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
50 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 ("[E]lectronically listening to and recording the petitioner's
words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone
booth. .. .").
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sociation are not necessarily conducted in places or through methods
in which individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact,
to be effective, political and other expressive activity may sometimes
need to occur in zones that are not private. Furthermore, as men-
tioned, First Amendment claims are unlike Fourth Amendment
claims in that the former are not weakened by disclosure to a third
party.5 ' The protections of the First Amendment are therefore differ-
ent from, and in some ways broader than, the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.
Nevertheless, there is disagreement over whether courts must ana-
lyze both the First and Fourth Amendments when considering the
constitutionality of government surveillance programs.5 The few
courts to address the issue of whether the First and Fourth Amend-
ments are coextensive have reached different conclusions. In ACLU
v. Clapper, a case concerning the Section 215 program, the govern-
ment argued that surveillance that does not violate the Fourth
Amendment is necessarily consistent with the First Amendment,
"even though [the surveillance] may be directed at communicative or
associative activities."" The district court judge found this argument
to be convincing, though he did not explicitly rule on the issue of
whether a First Amendment violation is possible in the absence of a
Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the judge concluded that the
Section 215 program did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights.54 In doing so, he rejected the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU")'s argument that the Section 215 program
likely has a chilling effect because it deters people from contacting
the ACLU who would otherwise do so. The argument that he two
Amendments provide coextensive zones of protection, and Judge Wil-
liam Pauley's favorable reception of this position, ignore the First
Amendment's promises of freedom of speech and association.
Other courts have recognized that the differences between the
First and Fourth Amendment require courts to undertake a separate
51 See In re First Nat. Bank, Englewood, Colo., 701 F.2d 115, 118 (10th Cir. 1983) (recount-
ing that the Supreme Court has acknowledged that individuals still retain their First
Amendment right to association, even where the governmental action is directed at third
parties).
52 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment
Regulation of Relational Surmeillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 795 (2008) ("One way to deal with
this conundrum might be to view the Fourth Amendment through a special First
Amendment lens in cases implicating expressive activity.").
53 Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 753.
54 See id. at 753-54 ("[B]ulk metadata collection does not burden First Amendment rights
substantially.").
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analysis for each Amendment. For example, in Tabbaa, plaintiffs
challenged a government policy that targeted Americans who trav-
eled abroad to attend conferences about Islam. This policy author-
ized border agents to detain and interrogate attendees as they
crossed back into the United States.5 In its 2007 decision, the Se-
cond Circuit analyzed the policy under the Fourth Amendment
and-separately-under the First Amendment.57  The court specifi-
cally noted that it was required to conduct these separate analyses,
stating that "distinguishing between incidental and substantial bur-
dens under the First Amendment requires a different analysis, apply-
ing different legal standards, than distinguishing what is and is not
routine in the Fourth Amendment border context."5  In another
case, the Second Circuit subjected a subpoena to compel the disclo-
sure of information to separate First Amendment scrutiny, and ulti-
mately narrowed the subpoena as a result of this First Amendment
analysis.5 In Ealy, the Fifth Circuit similarly held that the First
Amendment could limit the power of a grand jury." All of these de-
cisions were based on the principle that the First and Fourth
Amendments protect different rights and act in different ways.
Courts should apply this principle to mass surveillance programs, and
consider the two Amendments separately.
In contrast with the courts in the above cases, some courts have
expressly found that they are only required to complete a Fourth
Amendment analysis, and even suggested that this analysis is suffi-
cient to protect First Amendment interests. These decisions state that
if a search satisfies the Fourth Amendment, no independent inquiry
under the First Amendment is required. This position ignores the
particular protections provided by the First Amendment. Further-
more, these decisions do not mean that courts can decline to conduct
a First Amendment analysis in considering challenges to the NSA
programs.
For example, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, police searched the office
of a university newspaper for photographs of a demonstration that
55 Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 102 n.4.
58 Id.
59 See Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York
Harbor, 667 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1981) (limiting the required disclosure so as to reduce
the impairment of the longshoremen's First Amendment rights).
60 See Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 227 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he First Amendment can
serve as a limitation on the power of the grand jury to interfere with a witness' freedoms
of association and expression.").
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had occurred on the campus."' The newspaper challenged the search
under the First and Fourth Amendments.12 The Supreme Court, re-
versing the Ninth Circuit, found that the search was permissible." In
rejecting the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge, the Court stated
that the First Amendment does not require a special showing for the
issuance of a warrant to search for evidence reasonably believed to be
on a newspaper's premises." The Court indicated that even when
First Amendment interests are implicated, proper application of the
Fourth Amendment is sufficient to protect those interests.5 However,
the Court did say that when First Amendment interests are implicat-
ed, the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements must be applied
with "particular exactitude."" In response to Zurcher, Congress passed
the Privacy Protection Act, which makes it illegal for law enforcement
to search and seize journalists' work product materials.
The outcome in Zurcher does not mean that a court can choose
not to conduct an independent First Amendment analysis with re-
spect to the NSA programs. The First Amendment interest at issue in
Zurcher was the freedom of the press, not the freedom of speech or of
association. Though journalists are certainly chilled by surveillance,
the implications of the NSA programs for the freedoms of speech and
association are far broader than the chilling effect of the targeted
search in Zurcher, which concerned a specific investigation that was
conducted pursuant to the issuance of a warrant based on probable
cause. This situation is in no way similar to the bulk collection of
most Americans' telephony metadata, which raises independent First
Amendment concerns unlike the situation that faced the plaintiffs in
Zurcher." Thus, the fact that the Zurcher court did not find it neces-
sary to engage in a separate First Amendment analysis does not sug-
gest that other courts should omit this analysis when evaluating mass
surveillance programs.
61 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 551 (1978).
62 Id. at 552.
63 Id. at 567-68.
64 Id. at 565.
65 Id. ("[T]he prior cases do no more than insist that the courts apply the warrant require-
ments with particular exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered
by the search.").
66 Id.
67 See generally The Privacy Protection Act of 1980, EPIC.ORG, https://epic.org/privacy/ppa/ .
68 Caidin Thistle, Note, A First Amendment Breach: The National Security Agency's Electronic Sur-
veillance Program, 38 SETON HALL L. REv. 1197, 1228 (2008) ("Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of Press v. AT&T Co. raised concerns that prevented the court from recognizing First
Amendment rights independent of the Fourth Amendment. These concerns would not
exist in the context of NSA surveillance as demonstrated by ACLUv. NSA.").
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However, Zurcher is not the only case to state this position. In Re-
porters Committee for Freedom of the Press v. American Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., the D.C. Circuit found that a telephone company could
provide the phone billing records of investigative journalists to law
enforcement agents." Citing the recent Zurcher decision, the court
stated, "the guarantees of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments achieve
their purpose and provide every individual with sufficient protection
against good faith investigative action for the full enjoyment of his
First Amendment rights of expression."" The holding in Reporters
Committee is limited to the context of a "good faith investigation."" In
addition, the court was motivated by fear of a "slippery slope" scenar-
io in which journalists, or any individual subject to an investigation,
would claim that their First Amendment rights were implicated by
that investigation." This scenario would force courts to determine
that the First Amendment interests of some people were more im-
portant than those of other people. This concern is less salient with
respect to mass surveillance programs that collect information about
most Americans.
Finally, in Jabara v. Kelley, the plaintiff, a member of several Arab
74organizations, was investigated by the NSA and the FBI. The court
held that the plaintiffs Fourth Amendment rights were not violated,
and that it did not need to conduct separate First Amendment analy-
sis. Citing Reporters Committee, the court stated that "the First
Amendment and Fourth Amendment provide coextensive zones of
privacy in the context of a good faith criminal investigation" and ex-
tended this reasoning to cover "good faith national security investiga-
tions which are not strictly criminal in nature."7 5 Again, this holding
is limited to the context of a good faith investigation. It does not ap-
ply to broad surveillance programs such as those run by the NSA,
which are entirely different from the specific investigations at issue in
Zurcher, Reporters Committee, and jabara.
69 593 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
70 Id. at 1054.
71 Id. at 1070-71.
72 Id. at 1059.
73 Id. at 1060 ("In other words, under plaintiffs' approach the courts would have to decide
that certain individuals' First Amendment activities are more important than those of
others . . . .").
74 476 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
75 Id. at 572.
1490 [Vol. 18:5
SURVEILLING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION
III. FIRST AMENDMENTJURISPRUDENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE
SECTION 215 PROGRAM
A. Introduction
This Part discusses the existing jurisprudence concerning the First
Amendment, with a focus on how courts have addressed government
actions that deter people from engaging in protected activities. It
begins by describing the legal test that courts apply when analyzing
government actions for compliance with the First Amendment. Part
III.C discusses the chilling of expressive and associative freedom that
occurs when First Amendment rights are violated. Part III.D identi-
fies three driving principles of First Amendment jurisprudence, be-
ginning with the principle that the government generally should not
target the associational activity of citizens by collecting associational
information. The second principle is the prevention of government
deterrence of expressive and associational activity, which is at the
heart of the chilling effect. The third principle is that government
activity must be effective and tailored to meet a specific goal. Part
III.D also discusses how each of these principles relates to the First
Amendment test and to the analysis of the chilling effect. Finally,
Part III.E applies these principles to the Section 215 program, and
concludes that this program violates the First Amendment.
B. The First Amendment Test
Courts have long recognized that government restrictions on as-
sociation or speech, even those that further a legitimate government
interest, can violate the First Amendment. When First Amendment
concerns are implicated, courts apply a standard of review referred to
as "exacting scrutiny.",6 This entails a two-part inquiry. First, the gov-
ernment action or program must serve a compelling (not merely le-
gitimate") government interest. Second, the scope of the disclosure
must be tailored to the government interest." The action or program
76 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) ("Since NAACP v. Albama we have re-
quired that the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scrutiny.").
77 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 75; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) ("The decisions of
this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of
a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First
Amendment freedoms.").
78 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("In a series of decisions this Court has held
that, even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the
end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be
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must effectively fulfill a government need "'that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational free-
doms."" This means that a program can be struck down for being
overbroad. Courts therefore balance the public's interest in civil lib-
erty against the government's interest in carrying out the action or
program, and consider the efficacy with which the action or program
fulfills the government's interest.
C. The Chilling Effect
The First Amendment is based on the assumption that the ex-
change of ideas and the open criticism of existing power structures
are positive and important values." The public's First Amendment
interest is measured in terms of the "chilling effect" of government
actions on the exercise of the freedoms of expression and association.
This refers to the power of government regulation to deter people
from acting in certain ways. Of course, laws are intended to "chill"
specific behaviors, such as stealing or killing. This can be understood
as a "benign" chilling effect." A harmful chilling effect can occur
when a government action deters behavior other than the act being
regulated." Most commonly, and for the purposes of this Article, a
chilling effect is said to occur when individuals seeking to engage in
First Amendment-protected activity are deterred from doing so by
government action that does not specifically target the protected ac-
tivity."
The chilling of First Amendment-protected speech is problematic
on two levels. First, free speech is an important value in its own right:
the freedom to express dissent is critical to the functioning of a dem-
viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose."); Britt v.
Superior Court, 574 P.2d 766, 768 (Cal. 1978) ("[T]he scope of the compelled disclosure
must be narrowly circumscribed to avoid undue interference with private associational
rights.").
79 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 623 (1984)).
80 See Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58
B.U. L. REv. 685, 692 n.35 (1978) ("[I]t seems clear that current first amendment doc-
trine is based primarily upon a view embracing positive values of speech.").
81 These terms are drawn from Professor Schauer's work. See id. at 690 (defining a "benign
chilling effect" as "an effect caused by the intentional regulation of speech or other activi-
ty properly subject to governmental control").
82 Id. at 690-91.
83 Id. at 692.
1492 [Vol. 18:5
SURVEllLlNG SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION
ocratic political system. As the Supreme Court explained, free ex-
pression is "of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to
those exercising their rights."" The right to free speech enjoys spe-
cial status in the United States," such that the government may even
have an affirmative responsibility to encourage it. 7 The Court has of-
ten stated that the First Amendment protects speech unless the
speech poses a "clear and present danger" of a substantive evil that
Congress has the right to prevent, such as the overthrow of govern-
ment institutions." Even in the context of incitement to revolution,
the Court noted in 1951, there could be a legitimate First Amend-
ment interest in allowing the speech, if the incitement has an addi-
tional purpose or effect." The Court stated that there is a public in-
terest in ensuring freedom of speech even for those advocating
armed overthrow of the government. In support, it cited the im-
portance of criticism and change in developing a healthy society, and
argued that even radical or unpleasant speech may contain important
truths.
Calling freedom of expression the "well-spring of our civiliza-
tion,"" the Court characterized that civilization as one in which offi-
cial beliefs constantly yield to challenges and are replaced by new
ideas.1 In addition, the Court expressed concern over the chilling
effect of government actions against people attempting to overthrow
the government, stating that "[s]uppressing advocates of overthrow
inevitably will also silence critics who do not advocate overthrow but
fear that their criticism may be so construed."2 The chilling of
84 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (holding unconstitutional a law that
prohibited registered members of the Communist Party from engaging in employment in
defense facilities).
85 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
86 Kristina Ash, Note, U.S. Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:
Credibility Maximization and Global Influence, 3 Nw.J. INr'L HUM. RTS. 1 (2005) (noting the
United States' commitment to promoting freedom of speech around the world under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a United Nations treaty).
87 Schauer, supra note 80, at 691 ("Free speech is an affirmative value-we are concerned
with encouraging speech almost as much with preventing its restriction by the govern-
ment.") (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-14 (1965)).
88 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming the conviction of the General
Secretary of the Communist Party USA because his exercise of speech involved the crea-
tion of a plot to overthrow the government).
89 Id. at 549 ("It is a commonplace that there may be a grain of truth in the most uncouth
doctrine, however false and repellent the balance may be.").
90 Id. at 550.
91 Id. ("The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error
which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other
truths.").
92 Id. at 549.
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speech thus has direct negative implications for democratic govern-
ance and social progress. The First Amendment establishes that all
systems and principles are up for debate, including fundamental
questions of governmental and political systems. It embodies the as-
sumption, "itself an orthodoxy, and the one permissible exception" to
the First Amendment prohibition on orthodoxies, that the search for
truth is best served by a broad and powerful guarantee of freedom of
speech.93
The second implication of the chilling effect is more complex and
difficult to measure. In addition to decreasing the engagement and
debate necessary for a democracy, the chilling of dissenting speech
can bring about profound changes in the way that individuals think.
If freedom of speech is chilled, so freedom of thought will be cur-
tailed. The Supreme Court referred to this when it stated, in the con-
text of the chilling of political speech, that " [1] iberty of thought soon
shrivels without freedom of expression."94 If interpersonal communi-
cation is restricted due to the chilling effect, people will eventually
lose the vocabularies of dissent and structural criticism. The result
would be a "general societal loss."95 If we could not share ideas with
others-the act of which requires both freedom of expression and
freedom of association-not only our speech but also our thoughts
would become more restricted. This is the fundamental danger of
the chilling effect.
The Supreme Court first referred to the chilling effect in the con-
text of constitutional protections in Wieman v. Updegraffin 1952.
The Court struck down an Oklahoma law that required state officers
and employees to take a "loyalty oath," which involved stating that
they were not part of any organization listed by the government as
"communist front" or "subversive ."9 Some teachers refused to take
the oath, claiming that it violated, among other things, the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Felix Frankfurter,
in a concurring opinion, described the effect of the law:
Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers affects not
only those who, like the appellants, are immediately before the Court. It
has an unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all
teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice; it makes for caution
and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.99
93 Id. at 550.
94 Id.
95 Schauer, supra note 80, at 693.
96 Note, The Chilling Efject in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808 (1969).
97 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 184-85 (1952).
98 Id. at 195 (Frankfurter,J., concurring).
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In a separate concurrence, Justice Hugo Black referenced the First
Amendment and its goals, stating
[i]t seems self-evident that all speech criticizing government rulers and
challenging current beliefs may be dangerous to the status quo. With full
knowledge of this danger the Framers rested our First Amendment on
the premise that the slightest suppression of thought, speech, press, or
public assembly is still more dangerous.
In subsequent cases, courts have affirmed the invidious nature of the
chilling effect. Judicial recognition of this effect, and the need to
prevent government actions that cause it, is the basis for the three
principles outlined in Part III.D.
By 1978, the chilling effect had become "a major substantive
component of [F]irst [A]mendment adjudication."' A line of cases
found that police infiltration of activist groups was unconstitutional
because it chilled the exercise of First Amendment rights.'' In addi-
tion, courts have recognized the chilling effect in other areas of law.
In labor law, for example, employer surveillance of labor organizing
activity constitutes an unfair labor practice. o0 This is because such
surveillance has a chilling effect on associational activity: employees
are less likely to participate in union organizing if they know that
their employers can learn which employees are involved.
In addition, Justice Sonia Sotomayor expressed concern about the
chilling effect in her concurrence in United States. v. Jones. In Jones,
the Supreme Court unanimously determined that the FBI violated
the Fourth Amendment by attaching a GPS tracking device to a sus-
pect's car and monitoring the car's movements for twenty-eight days
without a warrant.'09 Though the majority opinion was based on the
common law of trespass, Justice Sotomayor separately discussed First
Amendment concerns.0 4  She noted that the chilling effect could
have a significant impact in light of modern surveillance technology,
and warned that Americans may be afraid to exercise the rights of
free speech and free association guaranteed by the First Amendment
99 Id. at 194 (Black, J., concurring).
100 Schauer, supra note 80, at 685.
101 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. Rochford, 75 F.R.D. 435 (N. D. Ill. 1976) (finding
that the plaintiffs, an activist group, did not have "an adequate remedy at law to protect
them from the effects of defendants' surveillance activities").
102 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1); see also Interfering with Employee Rights (Section 7 and 8(a)(1)), NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-
rights-section-7-8al ("[E]mployers may not respond to a union organizing drive by
threatening, interrogating, or spying on pro-union employees, or by promising benefits if
they forget about the union.").
103 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
104 Id. at 956.
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because they are aware that the government can collect personal in-
formation.ios
D. The Three Drivers ofFirst Amendment Law
Three principles, or drivers, underlie the existing freedom of as-
sociation jurisprudence. The first principle comes from the recogni-
tion that often citizens mustjoin together in groups in order to speak
effectively.0  Therefore, the First Amendment protects citizens
against the disclosure of information that reveals with whom they as-
sociate. Though this has often been expressed as a prohibition on
the disclosure of an organization's membership, this expression is a
feature of the mode of association that was prevalent at the time the
law developed, rather than a substantive element of the law. The
principle is just as applicable to the present-day collection of elec-
tronic information as it was to the collection of membership lists in
the pre-computer age. The second key driver is the prevention of de-
terrence, which is at the heart of the chilling effect. Under this prin-
ciple, the First Amendment prevents the government from deterring
citizens' speech and association. Government programs that (by vir-
tue of common sense) appear that they will deter individuals from
exercising their First Amendment rights are suspect. We know that
individuals are more likely to censor their behavior when they suspect
that they are being monitored.'7 Because of this, mass surveillance
can chill expression and association. Therefore, courts must analyze
the NSA programs for consistency with the First Amendment. The
third feature is scope: courts require that the intrusion be both tar-
geted and effective, such that it furthers the government's compel-
ling interest without infringing on rights unnecessarily. A govern-
ment action or program must be tailored to meet the compelling
government interest, or its overbreadth will render it unconstitution-
al. The vast scope of the NSA programs suggests that they may fail
this aspect of the First Amendment test. With respect to the Section
215 program, the efficacy requirement is likely not met either, as the
program failed to achieve the government's interest in reducing ter-
rorist attacks. The remainder of this Subpart will discuss the three
105 Id.
106 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958) (deciding a matter involving all Alabama
members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People against a
judgment requiring the names and addresses of Alabama members).
107 See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 77,
172-73 (1991).
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drivers in turn, and the next subpart will apply the drivers to the Sec-
tion 215 program in more detail.
1. The First Driver- The Government Cannot Target Citizens'Associative
Information
The First Amendment protects the freedom of association. This is
an essential element of freedom of speech, because speech is often
only effective when individuals join together. os Because of the
chilling effect, discussed above, freedom of association requires pri-
vacy of associational membership in order to be meaningful"'9 In a
line of cases beginning in 1958, the Supreme Court found that the
Constitution prohibits government attempts to stifle civil society or-
ganizations, and protects these organizations against government at-
tempts to reveal membership information."o In NAACP v. Alabama,
the Court found that the freedom of NAACP members to associate
would be violated if the organization were forced to disclose its mem-
bership list.'' The Court likened compelling the release of member-
ship lists to forcing the members to wear identifying arm-bands, cit-
ing the dangers that both requirements would cause for associative
freedom."' In doing so, the Court recognized that targeting associa-
tive information would chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.
Since NAACP v. Alabama, courts have found other laws unconstitu-
tional because of their chilling effect on activities protected by the
First Amendment. In Shelton v. Tucker, for example, the Supreme
Court struck down an Arkansas law that required teachers to disclose
every group to which they had belonged in the past five years, as a
condition of employment."3 The Court found the law unconstitu-
tional because it chilled the teachers' freedom to associate."4 A se-
cond Arkansas case, Bates v. City of Little Rock, concerned a law that
required organizations to disclose their membership lists, ostensibly
for tax reasons. Members of the local NAACP chapter claimed that
their membership was decreasing as a result of the law, and sought to
avoid disclosure. The Supreme Court found that the law was not a
"frontal attack" on the freedoms of speech and association."5  In-
108 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 449.
109 Id. at 462.
110 Id. at 458-59, 463.
111 Id. at 460.
112 Id. at 462.
113 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
114 Id.
115 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
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stead, it was unconstitutional because it "stifled" those freedoms
through "more subtle government interference.""' Again, the Court
invoked the chilling effect to invalidate the targeting of associative in-
formation.
2. The Second Driver: The First Amendment's Preventative Element
The First Amendment prevents the government from deterring
expression and association."' In Bates, discussed above, the Court was
concerned that individuals might have exercised their right to associ-
ation but did not do so, in part because of the government act. The
NAACP chapter claimed that members were leaving the organization,
and new members were deterred from joining, as a result of the Ar-
kansas law. The Court accepted this, stating that though the "repres-
sive effect" was partly due to private attitudes, it only came about be-
cause of the government's action. Therefore, the Court said, "the
threat of substantial government encroachment upon important and
traditional aspects of individual freedom is neither speculative nor
remote.""1 The Court did not require that the NAACP prove a nega-
tive, and seemed to apply a commonsense understanding of the
chilling effect. The Court likewise applied a "commonsense stand-
ard" in recognizing a chilling effect in Shelton, the case concerning
teachers' freedom of association."' This prevention principle estab-
lishes that the government may be prohibited from taking certain ac-
tions because those actions create a chilling effect.
3. The Third Driver The Government Program Must Be Effective and
Appropriately Targeted
Efficacy and targetedness are related requirements, both of which
must be met for a government action or program to satisfy the First
Amendment. The efficacy requirement is straightforward: it dictates
that a program that infringes upon civil liberties cannot be justified if
it is not effective in fulfilling the government's goal. To survive First
Amendment scrutiny, the government program or action in question
116 Id.
117 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (noting that prompt judicial review of
the state's denial of licenses to a theater to show a film is necessary to minimize the deter-
rent effect of a possible erroneous denial); see also Schauer, supra note 80, at 689 ("The
very essence of a chilling effect is an act of deterrence.").
118 Bates, 361 U.S. at 524.
119 Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor,
667 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 1981).
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must serve a compelling government interest. However, it is not
enough for the government to demonstrated the existence of this in-
terest: the program must also be structured so that it serves the in-
terest.121
If the government has a more targeted means of fulfilling its need,
it is not permitted to choose a course of action that has a broad
chilling effect.12 2 This suggests a balancing test in which the public's
interest in preserving First Amendment freedoms, and ensuring that
any intrusions on those freedoms are narrow in scope, is weighed
against the government's interest in the program. Assessing the rela-
tive strength of the latter requires consideration of the program's ef-
ficacy."'
To grant a government demand for information about organiza-
tional membership, courts require that the government "show a sub-
stantial relation between the information sought and a subject of
overriding and compelling state interest."2 4 For example, in Gibson,
the Florida government asserted an interest in determining whether
Communist Party members had joined the NAACP and demanded
that the Miami NAACP disclose its membership list. 125 The Court
recognized a compelling government interest in obtaining infor-
mation about the Communist Party, but found that the relationship
between the government interest and the information sought was too
tenuous tojustify forcing the release of the membership list." 6
A program can also be invalid under the First Amendment if it is
overbroad. As the scope of a program increases, so does its potential
to have a chilling effect, because the government collects more in-
formation that could potentially be used against citizens. For exam-
ple, in Shelton, teachers were required to disclose "every conceivable
associational tie," including relationships with religious, professional,
and political organizations. This breadth intensified the chilling ef-
120 ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003), affd and remanded, 542 U.S. 656
(2004).
121 Id.
122 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1973).
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(c) (1); PCLOB SEcTION 215 REPORT, supra note 9, at 8.
124 Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963).
125 Id. at 542.
126 Id. at 550; see also Strandburg, supra note 1, at 347.
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fect.'" When a government program is large in scope, it is more like-
ly to violate the First Amendment.25
E. The Section 215 Program Violates the First Amendment
1. Applying the First Driver: The Section 215 Program Collects
Associative Information
The cases that established the presumption against government
targeting of associational data were decided before citizens began to
associate using digital communications technology. However, the
principles that animate the associative freedom cases of the 1950s and
1960s indicate that mass electronic surveillance raises analogous First
Amendment concerns.
In past decades, people necessarily exercised their First Amend-
ment rights of expression and association very differently from the
ways in which they exercise those rights today. People more often at-
tended meetings in person, their organizations were relatively static
and defined, and they had formal lists of members. While these
forms of association persist, associational activity is now often carried
out by technological means. Furthermore, the forms of association as
well as the means have changed: technology allows for the rapid
emergence of new groups and affiliations, allows people to learn
about and support a cause early in its existence, and erases many ob-
. . 129stacles to organizing.
This change has implications for associational life. Part of this
concerns access to information: people can communicate with oth-
ers and share ideas more easily because of communications technol-
ogy. But there is a psychological element as well. As one commenta-
tor wrote of the Arab Spring protests in 2010 and 2011, "[s]ocial
networks have broken the psychological barrier of fear by helping
many to connect and share information."'"0 The perception that the
use of communications technology is private has likely made people
more willing to engage in associational activity than they would be if
they had to physically attend, for example, a meeting of an unpopu-
127 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); see also Strandburg, supra note 1, at 346 (ar-
guing that the government's request for information in Shelton was unconstitutional be-
cause it lacked specificity).
128 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 500 (1965).
129 Strandburg, supra note 52, at 745.
130 Saleem Kassim, Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped by Social Media,
POLICYMIC (July 3, 2012), http://mic.com/articles/ 10642/twitter-revolution-how-the-
arab-spring-was-helped-by-social-media.
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lar political group. This is particularly true because groups in which
people are linked by technology can form without a set number of
members, and people might join an online community when they
would notjoin a small physical group.
The means by which people associate with each other has
changed dramatically because of changes in communications tech-
nology. The fact that cell phones (which are often also small com-
puters) are now ubiquitous means that people rely on them for many
activities, including those protected by the First Amendment. And as
the means of association has changed, so has the means of associa-
tional chill.
Digital data is the present-day analog of membership lists, except
that metadata reveals even more than membership lists did in the
1950s and 1960s. Admittedly, modern metadata collection is differ-
ent from the membership lists at issue in the First Amendment case
law in that with respect to metadata, the associational information is
connected to the individual rather than to the organization. In the
context of modern communications technology, however, this is ef-
fectively the same thing. Because associational activities now take
place through digital means, an individual's metadata provides all the
information that membership lists provided in the past. Like associa-
tions' membership lists, phone metadata provides information about
who is associating with whom, and at what time. This can reveal
much about the context of the interaction. In fact, metadata may re-
veal more than traditional, relatively static membership lists ever
could.3 3 Thus, the chilling effect may be broader in the context of
metadata collection than it was in the days when associative infor-
mation was gleaned from organizations' membership lists. This is
particularly true given the secretive nature of NSA surveillance; un-
certainty about the scope of collection and means of targeting could
prompt individuals to err on the side of not communicating or not
associating with certain individuals or groups.
Records of phone calls and text messages reveal association in
many ways. For example, many meetings are now carried out via
phone. In addition, even when physical meetings occur, people of-
131 Strandburg, supra note 52, at 751.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 752 ("Relational surveillance, even more than government investigation of mem-
bership in traditional associations, has the potential to chill not only knowing association




JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ten call or text each other before, after, or in lieu of attending the
physical meeting. For example, suppose I attend meetings with the
same group of people every Monday and Thursday at 8 PM. I fre-
quently walk to the meetings with four friends who are also members.
We arrange to meet a few minutes before the meeting, either
through a group text message or a series of phone calls. Once we ar-
rive at the meeting location, we have to call someone who is already
inside the building to unlock the door and let us in. Metadata could
reveal a significant amount of information about our group and the
meeting attendees: it allows the government to map networks and
activities.' 5 Therefore, to collect metadata is to target associational
information-which implicates the First Amendment.
2. Applying the Second Driver: The Section 215 Program Deters the
Exercise ofFirst Amendment Rights
Common sense suggests that the mass electronic surveillance
conducted by the government implicates the First Amendment.
Though there may be some situations in which it is unclear whether a
government action or program raises First Amendment concerns, this
is not the case with respect to the Section 215 program. This pro-
gram has several characteristics that make First Amendment concerns
particularly salient. First, and most important, is the sheer breadth of
the program. Under the Section 215 program, a citizen's data was
very likely to be obtained by the government. This means that any
chilling effect is also widespread. Second, the government did not
need probable cause, or even reasonable grounds, to believe that a
citizen is implicated in a crime in order to obtain the individual's in-
formation under Section 215. This dramatically changes the balance
of power between citizens and the government. Third, the govern-
ment could investigate Americans based in part on activities that are
protected by the First Amendment. Finally, the program's lack of
transparency means that subjects of surveillance never knew that
their data was being obtained; gag orders prohibited service providers
from disclosing that they released information. In light of these fea-
tures, the Section 215 program implicates the First Amendment.
Other mass surveillance programs likely share these features. Courts
should therefore recognize that First Amendment concerns are likely
implicated in cases involving mass electronic surveillance, and should
135 Jillian York, The Harms of Surveillance to Privacy, Expression and Association, GLOBAL
INFORMATION SOCIETY WATCH (2014), available at http://www.giswatch.org/sites/
default/files/theharm s~ofsurveillance.pdf.
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approach such cases with the presumption that they will need to ana-
lyze Fourth Amendment and First Amendment concerns separately.
Scholars have long recognized that surveillance by authorities can
affect individuals' behavior. For example, in the eighteenth century,
Jeremy Bentham designed the panopticon: a large tower with win-
dows on all sides, from which a guard could see each of the inmates
of a prison.'" Though the guard could not watch all of the prisoners
all of the time, the prisoners would have to assume that they were be-
ing watched at any given moment, and would thus comply with au-
thority. Michel Foucault later explained that the effect of the panop-
ticon is "to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent
visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power."" He also
noted that the principle of the panopticon could be used to ensure
obedience outside of the prison context. Mass surveillance functions
like the panopticon. Just as the guard does not watch every prisoner
all the time, the NSA is not actually reading through the information
of every American. But, like the prisoners, Americans now have to
assume that their information will be subject to government scrutiny.
In fact, the specific chilling effect of the NSA programs has al-
ready been documented. An extensive report by Human Rights
Watch and the ACLU found that the surveillance has disrupted the
work of journalists and lawyers, who adopt elaborate security
measures to protect confidential information.'"8 In addition to
providing a concrete example of the chilling effect, the study raises
the broader point that the chilling of the press and of the exercise of
the right to legal counsel can have far-reaching implications for the
rest of society. The chilling of the press, in particular, undermines
our ability to learn about and respond to government actions. This is
emphasized in a 2014 study, conducted by the Reporters Committee
for a Free Press, which found that sources have become more reluc-
tant to communicate with reporters as a result of government surveil-
lance.3  A separate study found that NSA surveillance also has a sig-
136 JEREMY BENTHAM, PANOPTICON OR, THE INSPECTION HoUSE 4 (1791).
137 FOUCAULT, supra note 107, at 201.
138 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITH LIBERTY TO MONITOR ALL: How LARGE-SCALE US
SURVEILLANCE IS HARMING JOURNALISM, LAW, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3-5 (2014),
available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usnsaO 7l4
ForUPload_0.pdf; see also ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 696 (6th Cir. 2007)
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plaintiffs).
139 Jamie Schuman, The NSA's Shadow: Despite Court Rulings and Rfiorms, Surveillance-Induced
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nificant chilling effect on American writers, who stated that the NSA
programs have made them less likely to research or write about cer-
tain topics, and less likely to communicate with sources or other con-
tacts in different countries.140 As with that of reporters, the chilling of
writers has broad implications for the freedom and openness of pub-
lic debate. Finally, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has collected
specific examples of how the Section 215 program has chilled Ameri-
cans' exercise of their right to association; the affected individuals in-
clude members of religious groups, human rights workers, environ-
mentalists, and gun rights activists.14 ' Government surveillance has
also had a chilling effect on the use of the Internet by Muslim-
Americans.142 These examples prove that the chilling effect, though
difficult to measure, is clearly occurring as a result of NSA surveil-
lance.
3. Applying the Third Driver: The Section 215 Program is Ineffective
and Overbroad
The Section 215 program violates the First Amendment by virtue
of its broad scope in combination with its ineffectiveness. The
chilling effect, described above, and its attendant impacts on associa-
tional and expressive freedom, weighs against the constitutionality of
the Section 215 program. However, a program can be upheld under
the First Amendment even though it has a chilling effect if the gov-
ernment interest in conducting the program outweighs the public's
First Amendment interest. Generally, courts recognize that national
security concerns should be afforded significant weight. When a
program fails to contribute meaningfully to national security, howev-
er, the program is not justified. Furthermore, a program whose
scope is disproportionate to its effectiveness will likely be struck down
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The Section 215 program failed to meet the efficacy requirement.
Though the government has touted the success of the program in
preventing terrorist attacks,143 the Privacy and Civil Liberties Over-
sight Board (PCLOB), the executive branch agency that conducted
an independent investigation into the Section 215 program, found
that the program was ineffective. In fact, despite using numerous
metrics to search for instances in which the program was successful,
the PCLOB found that the Section 215 program did not thwart a sin-
gle terrorist attack.1 4 4 Section 215 data contributed to the identifica-
tion of an unknown terror suspect in only one case. This suspect had
already been the subject of an FBI investigation and was linked to
other pending FBI investigations, and the decision to monitor the
suspect came from the monitoring of a specific foreign number ra-
ther than from the bulk collection of records. Thus, the government
could have reached the same result by asking the service providers for
the individual suspect's metadata. (The suspect was charged with
sending money to a terrorist group.) 145
There is now widespread agreement hat the Section 215 program
was not sufficiently effective to warrant its impacts on privacy and civil
liberties. The PCLOB stated this unequivocally, and recommended
that the program be shut down." The President's personally ap-
pointed Review Group agreed that the government should not con-
tinue to store the data.14 ' Even Deputy NSA Director John Inglis ap-
peared to indicate that it would be more effective for the agency to
seek the information from phone providers on a case-by-case basis.148
The Section 215 program also failed to meet the requirement that
a government action be appropriately targeted. The scope of Section
215 is one of its most striking characteristics. As noted, this program
collected information indiscriminately. In its report on the Section
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CNN (June 19, 2013, 6:38 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/18/politics/nsa-leaks/.
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215 program, the PCLOB stated that "[t]he extraordinary breadth of
this program creates a chilling effect on the First Amendment rights
of Americans."'4  The report accepted that the government had a
compelling interest in combating terrorism, but found that the Sec-
tion 215 program failed to meet the tailoring requirement.5 0 Given
this combination of ineffectiveness and a lack of tailoring, the Section
215 program does not satisfy the First Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Part III of this Article has argued that the Section 215 program is
not permitted under the First Amendment. However, as discussed in
Part II, this analysis should also be applied to the NSA's other mass
surveillance programs. In general, courts should consider the First
Amendment, and apply the exacting scrutiny standard, in cases con-
cerning mass electronic surveillance programs. As noted, this in-
volves weighing the public's interest in maintaining civil liberties
against the government's interest in conducting the program. With
respect to programs involving Internet and phone communication, it
is likely that First Amendment concerns will be implicated. However,
the balance of interests may be different depending on the specific
program. For this reason, the First Amendment analysis may yield
different results. Therefore, courts should conduct a First Amend-
ment analysis with respect to each program.
Mass surveillance programs impact Americans' important rights to
freedom of expression and association. Courts should extend existing
First Amendment case law to address these programs. While, as ar-
gued in Part III.D, the underlying principles of the existing law estab-
lish that courts should conduct an independent First Amendment
analysis in mass surveillance cases, many of the older cases deal with
outdated or less popular forms of associational activities. The ubiqui-
ty of cell phones, and the government's capacity to collect virtually all
communications data of virtually all Americans, have altered the con-
stitutional calculus. The chilling effect and overbreadth of the NSA
programs mean that they may violate the First Amendment, and the
Fourth Amendment alone does not adequately protect citizens from
this violation. If the promise of the First Amendment is to mean any-
thing, it must be interpreted to apply to mass surveillance programs.
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